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Abstract 
Governments around the world are utilizing data and information systems to manage the 
COVID-19-crisis. To obtain an overview of all these efforts, this global report presents the 
expert reports of 21 countries regarding the relation between the COVID-19-crisis and the 
information polity. A comparative analysis of these reports highlights that governments focus 
on strengthening six functions: management of information for crisis management, 
publishing public information for citizens, providing digital services to citizens, monitoring 
citizens in public space, facilitating information exchange between citizens and developing 
innovative responses to COVID-19. The comparative overview of information responses to 
the COVID-19-crisis shows that these responses cannot only be studied from a rational 
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1. Introduction 
The COVID-19 Pandemic has diffused globally at an alarming rate and has forced countries to 
undertake a broad range of unprecedented interventions in order to protect their citizens 
from this disease. The lockdowns that we have seen in many countries are the clearest 
manifestation of the extreme measures that have been taken to stop the spread of the 
disease. Health experts have played a key role in the development of policies, but there has 
also been a strong emphasis on information management as a key element in effective crisis 
management (Ienca & Vayena, 2020). Governments around the world are utilizing data and 
information systems to provide crucial insights about the spread of the virus and the 
management of this pandemic.  
 
The media has presented a range of analyses and insights about the technological facilities 
developed to help manage the pandemic, including the provision of ‘corona dashboards’ and 
mobile phone contract tracing apps. Optimistic analyses highlight the key role these 
information systems play in detecting new occurrences of the disease and argue that this type 
of information provides the basis for chirurgical interventions (see for example the paper on 
the ‘hammer and the dance’: Pueyo, 2020). Critical analyses of these solutions highlight the 
risks of creating a surveillance state and the large-scale invasion of personal privacy (see for 
example Harari’s (2020) critical analysis of ‘under-the-skin’ surveillance). Whilst there is an 
interesting debate about the pros and cons of these solutions, there is currently no systematic 
overview of how countries around the world are using information technologies in their crisis 
management policies. For this reason, we have decided to bring together researchers from 
21 countries and all continents to provide a broad overview of the relationship between the 
COVID-19-crisis and the information polity. We have asked these authors to present a 
systematic overview of the relation between the COVID-19-crisis and the information polity 
in their country on the basis of the following questions: 
 
• How and when did the corona crisis manifest itself in your country? 




• What ethical and sensitive issue were identified in this role? 
• What was the political and public debate about using new technology in way? 
• What was the outcome of these debates and the solution(s) eventually selected? 
• Is there any published information about the success of the chosen solution(s)? 
• Are there any concrete indications of negative effects of the chosen solution(s)? 
 
This global report presents country reports of 21 countries and an analysis of the patterns 
discernable in these findings. The country reports have been drafted by national experts on 
their reading of the media reports and of formal (government, NGO and academic) 
publications. The reports are not based on systematic academic research, but on an 
explorative analysis of available materials and therefore further research is needed to validate 
and extend these findings. At the same time, in view of the urgent need for debates about 
issues surrounding the pandemic, we deemed it necessary to generate knowledge about 
informational and technological responses in different countries, in order to enable a more 
informed public and political debate on these issues and to help to guide and focus future 
academic research. 
 
An overview of these countries in terms of total number of cases of COVID-19, total number 
of deaths, total number of tests and cases, deaths and tests per million inhabitants is 
presented in Table 1 below (ordered on the basis of the total number of cases). The table 
shows a huge variation in the human cost of the pandemic in different countries. Explanations 
for this variation are due in part to differences in national policy and strategy, a situation 
which cannot be divorced from the role and functioning of the information polity, or more 
accurately in this case national information polities. 
 


















1 USA 3,041,035 9,186 132,981 402 38,218,637 115,452 331,034,037 
2 Brazil 1,626,071 7,649 65,556 308 4,316,284 20,304 212,582,910 
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6 Spain 298,869 6,392 28,388 607 5,734,599 122,652 46,755,120 
8 UK 285,768 4,209 44,236 652 10,651,308 156,886 67,891,886 
9 Mexico 261,750 2,013 31,119 241 641,142 4,972 128,951,496 
11 Italy 241,819 3,997 34,869 578 5,962,744 98,626 60,458,424 
14 Turkey 206,844 2,452 5,241 62 3,682,673 43,659 84,351,507 
16 Germany 198,064 2,364 9,092 109 5,873,563 70,1 83,788,628 
20 Canada 105,935 2,806 8,693 230 2,975,711 78,833 37,747,023 
22 China 83,565 58 4,634 3 90,410,000 62,814 1,439,323,776 
25 Sweden 73,061 7,234 5,433 538 519,113 51,396 10,100,272 
30 Belgium 62,058 5,354 9,774 843 1,284,605 110,833 11,590,476 
32 Netherlands 50,657 2,956 6,128 358 616,376 35,971 17,135,554 
38 Singapore 44,983 7,688 26 4 757,746 129,506 5,851,040 
51 Ireland 25,531 5,17 1,741 353 467,852 94,735 4,938,531 
56 Japan 19,775 156 977 8 499,898 3,953 126,468,508 
64 S. Korea 13,181 257 285 6 1,346,194 26,257 51,270,007 
71 Australia 8,755 343 106 4 2,800,030 109,789 25,503,813 
74 Kenya 8,067 150 164 3 191,394 3,559 53,780,608 
111 Estonia 1,994 1,503 69 52 109,338 82,423 1,326,552 
122 
New 
Zealand 1,536 307 22 4 416,924 83,35 5,002,100 
Source: https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/, 7 July 2020 
 
It is not possible to provide a detailed analysis for each country discussed here. Rather, the 
approach taken is to provide a broad overview of events in each country in order to draw out 
comparative international themes, similarities and differences. This general overview is 
currently absent from existing published materials and as such represents a new contribution 
to our understanding of technological responses to the global COVID-19 pandemic. The 
country reports presented here are analyzed comparatively to exploratively identify general 
patterns in information polity responses to COVID-19. The country reports are presented 
alphabetically in section 2 of the report and are followed in section 3 by a more detailed 
comparative analysis. Our ambition here, is to contribute to societal and academic debates 
about the use of information technologies for dealing with the COVID-19-crisis. 
 





Paul Henman, University of Queensland, p.henman@uq.edu.au  
 
Australia is a federated state of six states and two territories. States have primary 
responsibility for public health emergency and infection disease management, while the 
national government has responsibility to infection control across national borders. Australia 
has managed COVID-19 infections remarkably well, with borders blocked for Chinese arrivals 
from 12 February 2020, and all arrivals from 20 March, with several internal state borders 
closed shortly thereafter. As of 1 July, Australia recorded 7834 infections and 104 deaths (that 
is, 307 and 4 per million people respectively), with over 60 percent of cases imported from 
overseas. 
 
Information technologies for mapping infections and modelling of infection spread has been 
central to the public governance of COVID-19 in Australia. However, such technologies have 
been utilised in a context of criticism over government secrecy and unaccountability. From 
March 2020, a new National Cabinet, constituted by the leaders of all state, territory and 
federal governments, relied on micro-simulation modelling to develop lockdown policies and 
procedures, but the governments were reluctant and slow in releasing their modelling for 
comparison with those of independent researchers. 
 
The Australian government also developed two smart phones apps for managing the COVID-
19 pandemic. Coronavirus Australia was released on 29 March by the federal Department of 
Health to provide access to official information, health information and updates, but it had 
little visibility and was simply an app version of the government’s informational website. 
These national level data were replicated at a state level on state government websites. 
Providing updated statistics, infographics and trend data, they had some rudimentary 
dashboard like characteristics, although they were not described as dashboards.  
 
In contrast, the COVIDSafe developed by the Australian government’s Digital Transformation 
Agency to support contact tracing of infected persons received considerable attention. Using 
the BlueTrace open-source application developed by the Singaporean government for its 
TraceTogether app, COVIDSafe was released on 26 April 2020. Data is stored on a single 
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centralised database hosted by Amazon cloud services, and accessed by state public health 
authorities. While there was initial strong take-up, its publication generated considerable 
public debate about privacy and the tracking of users. Several ‘mistakes’ by the national 
government reinforced privacy concerns:, at its launch the source code was promised and 
then delayed until 8 May; there were no clear legal privacy protections in place; the 
government initially failed to rule out making the app mandatory; the government failed to 
acknowledge significant technical limitations of COVIDSafe’s operation on Apple’s IOS 
systems; and, the levels of testing were not disclosed. The Australian government also 
oversold COVIDSafe, with the Prime Minister likening it to wearing sunscreen to protect 
against sun burn and subsequent skin cancer. This resulted in some people viewing the app 
as a protective panacea to COVID-19, and some organisations declaring that people without 
the app would be denied entry. The Prime Minister also sought to compel people to use the 
app by stating that it was necessary before lifting restrictions could be considered.  
 
Several factors diminished the app-related controversies. Specific legislation to clarify and 
strengthen privacy protections relating to the COVIDSafe app were instituted on 16 May. 
Downloads of the app stabilised at just over six million by the end of May. Most significantly, 
due to the significant success in controlling infections (typically less than 10 new infections a 
day during June, and only one death from 23 May to end June), restrictions began lifting mid-
May. Yet, as of late June, COVIDSafe had yet to be used to successfully identify contacts to an 
infected person, eliciting the question of whether the app created as a ‘shiny’ technical fix to 
a social problem? 
 
Belgium 
Rosamunde van Brakel, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Rosamunde.Van.Brakel@vub.be 
 
Belgium was hit relatively hard by the COVID-19 pandemic, with a high number of deaths. The 
virus was confirmed to have spread to Belgium on 4 February 2020. It became significantly 
worse after people returned from spring holiday at the beginning of March. The National 
Security Council ordered a ‘lockdown light’ from Friday 13 March at midnight onwards which 
included the closure of schools, discos, cafes and restaurants, non-essential shops and 
companies and the cancellation of all public gatherings and the message that people need to 
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work from home and leave the house as little as possible. Starting early May the lockdown 
measures were removed in different phases. Updates about number of deaths, hospital 
admissions, beds filled in intensive care and new cases were communicated via the main 
media outlets every day. Early in the outbreak Belgium did not have much test capacity but 
from April onwards the test capacity expanded significantly with first 10.000 to 19.900 tests 
a day at the beginning of May. 
 
At the end of March, the Minister of Health and the Minister of Digital Agenda and Privacy 
launched a taskforce ‘Data & Technology against Corona’. Members of the taskforce included 
representatives of the Ministry of Health, Sciensano, the e-health platform and the Belgian 
Data Protection Authority. The goal of the taskforce was to oversee and coordinate all 
mhealth initiatives. The possibility of developing a contact tracing app was explored but at 
the end it was concluded that this was not a decision for the Federal government to make but 
should be taken by the regional Flemish, Walloon and Brussels governments. The general 
vision of experts involved in the taskforce but also in the exit-committee is that the app should 
complement human contact tracing. The work of the taskforce was not transparent, and 
several open letters signed by academics and opinion pieces were published raising human 
rights and privacy issues about a possible app. Two surveys were conducted in Flanders asking 
about public acceptance of a possible contact-tracing-app and half of respondents indicated 
they would not install it. Human contact tracing started in June 2020 and an ICT platform and 
database were set up by Sciensano to support the work. Since it started the contact tracing 
has encountered many technical issues. Also, much criticism came from civil society and 
academia about the legal framework accompanying the tracing that it does not respect 
human rights.  
 
In June 2020 an inter-federal interdisciplinary working group was set up by Professor Bart 
Preneel from the University of Leuven who is one of the leading partners in the Decentralized 
Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (DP-3T) app initiative. The protocol proposed by this 
group uses Bluetooth Low Energy to track and log encounters with other users. It is 
considered the most privacy-friendly app solution as no data is stored centrally by the 
government.  The goal of the working group is to work out policy measures for the Belgian 
version of the app. A cooperation agreement between the regional governments was finalized 
 
 8 
in a couple of weeks, which usually would take 2 years to make this possible. It is expected 
that the app is operational in September 2020. 
 
Apart from the app surveillance technologies have been used by the government to enforce 
lockdown rules. Speaking drones have been used in Brussels to spread messages about social 
distancing, drones with heat cameras have been used to identify people illegally staying in 
their second homes and caravans at the coast.  Further, telecom data and smart video 
surveillance are used to track movements of people and to monitor how busy the shopping 




Maria Alexandra Cunha, Fundação Getulio Vargas, alexandra.cunha@fgv.br 
Erico Przeybilovicz, Fundação Getulio Vargas, erico.prz@fgv.br 
 
In January 2020, Brazil was aligned with WHO and closely followed the global crisis of COVID-
19. On the 26th the first case was confirmed, with the first death occurring on March 17th. 
After March 24th, the national policy started to diverge from WHO recommendations. 
President Bolsonaro gave a disastrous televised speech advocating a return to normality and 
the end of social distancing, blaming the media for spreading fear. Subsequently, the policies 
of the federal, state and municipal governments began to diverge from soft measures like 
social distancing to lockdowns. The Minister of Health was dismissed on April 16th and a new 
Minister took over, only to resign 28 days later. An Army General took office as interim 
Minister, a supposedly temporary arrangement that lasts to this day. On June 24th, Brazil 
counted 1.188 million confirmed cases, 53,830 deaths, high levels of underreporting, and an 
unknown number of tests (estimated at 2.3 tests for each positive case). With no easing of 
the crisis in sight, federal, state, and municipal governments are still adopting measures with 
different desired policy intentions.  
 
The federal government established three fronts of action: (1) strengthening the 
epidemiological monitoring systems; (2) preparing intensive care units (ICUs); and (3) 
enabling remote primary healthcare. IT supported these fronts by: (a) a flu monitoring system; 
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(b) updating the registration of 110 million people on the Health System eSUS database; (c) 
implementing Telesus, a robocall system for classification, diagnosis, tracking, and 
registration of epidemiological risk that was abandoned after the dismissal of the Minister 
following more than 23 million effective calls; (d) telemedicine focused primarily on assisting 
health professionals; (e) the Coronavirus-App for information about the disease; (f) the 
coronavirus-dashboard; (g) a citizen service channel through WhatsApp; and, (h) another 
dashboard to track resources for the pandemic. On June 5th, the interim Minister changed the 
coronavirus-dashboard to omit information on total cases and deaths. This provoked a strong 
reaction and the Supreme Court decided that the government must disclose the complete 
data. 
 
During the COVID-19 crisis, media, civil society, universities, representative institutions, 
states, and cities have used open data to launch COVID-19 dashboards reporting the spread 
of the disease. Small municipalities have been using social media to disseminate information 
and guidance. A few cities have also used drones to monitor agglomerations, while the 
telecom companies have established a dashboard to track movement in the towns available 
only to municipal governments. Contact tracing applications have been launched by startups 
without much support or public engagement. Another action supported by IT is the 
emergency aid, a benefit of three payments of BRL$ 600 per month (less than E$ 100) granted 
by the federal government to informal workers, micro-entrepreneurs, the self-employed, and 
the unemployed. More than 60 million people have received the benefit. However, the 
benefit request can be made only through the public bank's website or through an app, cruelly 
exposing the digital divide whereby 50 million people do not have internet access. Most of 
these individuals are eligible for the benefit and have experienced huge difficulties in 
accessing it. 
 
Public debate around the role of IT has concentrated on the digital divide, transparency, and 
privacy. The exclusion debate has focused on the inadequacy of a digital-only channel such as 
the Emergency Aid App, while transparency refers to the coronavirus-dashboard hiding 
information on deaths and cases. Privacy and surveillance issues have emerged from the use 
of citizen registration and monitoring systems, drones, and mobile data. At the same time, 
technology has allowed people to react, to produce information, and to launch "parallel" 
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coronavirus-dashboards based on open data provided by subnational governments, thus 
maintaining transparency. Social media has worked well in small towns as a way of 
disseminating information to the population.  
 
The political context has dramatically influenced the use of technology during the COVID-19 
crisis in Brazil. What started as a public health crisis has evolved into a broader political and 
institutional crisis, consequently drowning out the ethical debate on the use of IT.  
 
Canada 
Colin J. Bennett, University of Victoria, BC, cjb@uvic.ca  
 
As of mid-June, Canada had experienced around 100,000 confirmed cases of Covid-19 and 
around 8,000 deaths. Around 2 million Canadians have so far been tested. Those figures 
obscure a significant variation across the country. The vast majority of cases have occurred in 
Ontario and Quebec, and particularly in the Toronto and Montreal metropolitan areas. Other 
provinces, such as British Columbia, have fared relatively well. Canada’s proximity to the 
United States, the country with the highest number of cases and deaths makes Canada 
extremely vulnerable as a result of cross-border traffic. Many of the early cases in Quebec, 
for instance, were attributed to students returning from Spring Break in Florida, as well as to 
close ties to New York.   
 
Health care services are delivered through provincial governments in Canada, and so we have 
seen different provincial approaches to quarantining and social-distancing, testing criteria, 
and modes of public health communication. Health Canada, and the respective public health 
agencies in each province operate websites with dashboards on confirmed case counts and 
deaths by age and gender, testing rates, outbreaks and advice about preventive measures. 
Health Canada and Statistics Canada have been trying to ensure that the statistical reporting 
is consistent across the country.   
 
On contact-tracing, the federal government also initiated a recruitment drive for specialized 
contact-tracing volunteers to assist the provinces. It has been more cautious, however, in 
developing contact-tracing smart phone apps. Prime Minister Trudeau announced on May 
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22nd that the government would offer a strong recommendation for a particular app, but 
there was reportedly resistance from some provinces who preferred traditional approaches. 
Two provinces, Alberta and Newfoundland and Labrador, initially decided to develop their 
own apps. Neither has been popular. There was also push-back from civil liberties advocates 
and privacy regulators. The federal, provincial and territorial privacy commissioners issued a 
joint statement on May 7th, reminding governments that these devices will only be trusted if 
privacy and security considerations are front and center. The network of Canadian civil 
liberties organizations also weighed in to warn against overreaching surveillance measures 
with the potential to endure after the crisis is over, and the emergency powers are cancelled.  
 
Concerned to develop a coherent national approach, the federal government announced on 
June 18 that a voluntary contact-tracing app would be available in July – first in Ontario and 
then across the country. Covid Shield has been built using open-source code by the Ontario 
Digital Service in conjunction with a volunteer team from the Ottawa-based company Shopify.  
The app uses randomly generated anonymous codes and Bluetooth signals to track proximity 
and duration of contact. Those who have tested positive will he encouraged to upload their 
status using a unique code provided by a health care provider. The app will alert those who 
have been in close proximity to take appropriate action. The app is being promoted as totally 
anonymous, with no geo-tagging of location, and no centralized storage of the data. Initial 
feedback from the civil liberties advocates has been positive, although they did not seek the 
endorsement of the Federal Privacy Commissioner before announcing this decision.  
 
So far, the debate about contact-tracing in Canada, as elsewhere, has been framed as a binary 
choice between the use of shiny new smart-phone applications, and the laborious and 
traditional method of interviewing. However, the analysis of third-party transactional records 
might also play a role in the contact-tracing process: credit card transactions; reservation 
systems; membership lists; employee records; Barwatch programs; or the non-anonymized 
data captured from mass transit smart card systems. Canadian public health authorities have 
a right to demand and receive all such information under the emergency powers in our 
provincial Public Health Acts, and despite any provisions within provincial privacy laws. The 





Kaiping Chen, University of Wisconsin-Madison, kchen67@wisc.edu 
 
The COVID-19 pandemic started to explode in Wuhan in January 2020 and spread quickly to 
other provinces. Many cities across China started lockdown in February. Around the middle 
March, except for in the Hubei province, the average new daily cases dropped to single digits 
across China. Cities started to re-open in late March and the rate of infection has been well 
maintained since then. 
 
One crucial factor that enabled China to achieve a quick control of COVID-19 cases is in its use 
of information technology. Technology was adopted by all levels of government and was used 
penetrate deeply into people’s lives. The well-known state-led deployment of information 
technology to monitor COVID-19 was only possible due to cultural and structural institutions 
in China, without which enforcement via information technology will not be effective. 
 
The first is China’s extensive neighborhood governance system, serving as the backbone for 
monitoring. E-governance cannot be effectively enforced without complementary 
governance systems. The major neighborhood governance system in China is the 
“neighborhood/village committee” which was established in early 1950s. This agency 
integrates community self-governance and street-level bureaucracy. Take one large 
community in Shanghai for example, the neighborhood committee staff coordinated with the 
citizen manager of each apartment building to make sure that each household joined the 
apartment WeChat group, a place where residents obtain timely information of COVID-19 in 
the community and the city. The WeChat group is also a place for those who travelled to 
report where they went and their daily temperature. In hotspot communities, street-level 
bureaucrats performed “blanket search” to test every individual in the communities where 
infected people went. In the hotspot city Wuhan, tests were conducted on almost every 
citizen (i.e., 9.9 million people) in two weeks in May. 
 
The second is China’s use of its existing e-governance platforms and apps that citizens are 
already familiar with. From government websites to government apps, public dashboards for 
COVID-19 were created from the outset of the outbreak to provide citizens nuanced 
 
 13 
information about COVID-19, including daily number of new infections and deaths, as well as 
detailed mobility information regarding where these newly infected individuals had traveled. 
At the national level, the State Council embedded the new COVID-19 platforms into its 
existing official WeChat account. Once a user scans the WeChat QR code, they can engage 
with different platforms, from the latest cases, to COVID-19 services such as purchasing facial 
masks and mental health hotlines. Citizens can also post questions on the platform to interact 
with the state body. 
 
Sub-national level governments also embedded COVID-19 platforms into their existing apps, 
which have been used by many citizens. For instance, in Shanghai, citizens need to show their 
health QR code when they take public transportation, go to offices, restaurants and even 
neighborhood supermarkets. The health QR code is adopted from an existing app, “Get All 
Public Services Done Electronically”, that the city government developed for citizens to do 
over 30 bureaucratic services online such as tax and social welfare. This app was launched in 
September 2018 and within half a year, there are over 10 million app users (i.e., 40% of the 
population). In mid-February, this app created a section where citizens can obtain their health 
QR code using real names and national IDs. Citizens can also obtain the health QR code from 
other familiar platforms such as WeChat or Alipay. These apps do not send information to 
people who have been close to somebody with COVID-19. There is a nation-wide centralized 
database that integrates various data from citizens. This centralized database is used to 
determine the status of citizens’ health QR code. The health QR code was implemented in 
over 200 cities as is one of the largest digital monitoring efforts used to track COVID-19. There 
has been ongoing and extensive discussion between app developers, governments and the 
academia regarding how to ensure user privacy of these apps. Some citizens and enterprises 
also raised ethical concerns. 
 
Estonia 
Veiko Lember, Tallinn University of Technology, veiko.lember@ttu.ee 
 
The first COVID-19 case was confirmed in Estonia on February 27, while the government 
declared the state of emergency on March 12 after which borders and public spaces were 
gradually shut down, some regions (islands) were sealed off and social distancing regulations 
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were imposed. The first death attributed to COVID-19 was recorded on March 25. As of June 
15, the country of 1,3 million inhabitants had lost 69 people to the COVID-19 infection, while 
altogether 1,974 people out of 96,638 tested have been identified positive. Testing was 
initially restricted to the most vulnerable groups in society and to the people with explicit 
symptoms, while more targeted testing, e.g., in elderly care homes and among front-line 
workers was introduced later. In May, there was also two surveys initiated by the government 
to map the spread of the virus among the population and people without family doctor 
referrals could start using fee-based testing services of private labs. The lock-down was 
gradually eased from April 27 onwards, with the emergency situation ceasing on May 17. Still, 
borders remained partly closed and many organizations, including schools and universities, 
continued operating on-line. In general, the public accepted the imposed harsh restrictions.  
 
Information technology was used on several fronts to deal with the COVID-19 crisis. The 
government initially struggled in pooling health data and disseminating accurate information 
, and as a reaction, many private dashboard initiatives were launched by civil society 
organizations and universities. Some weeks into the crisis, the government managed to create 
a central data platform by upgrading the existing health data system. Relatedly, the national 
health agency also launched its own publicly accessible COVID-19 dashboard. In addition, the 
government used social campaigns as well as e-mail and mobile phone data available in the 
centralized population registry to reach out to citizens with crisis announcements. In addition 
to physically calling to and visiting people, drones and other technologies used by police to 
enforce various emergency regulations in public spaces. The government also initiated a 
mobility survey using mobile positioning data in cooperation with telecommunication and 
other private companies. The health system had to learn almost overnight how to organize 
online consultations (allegedly ca 75% of all family doctors consultations during the peak of 
the crisis), while the transition to distant learning was enabled by the already effective e-
school infrastructure, albeit with significant transaction costs for parents, students and 
teachers. 
 
Typical to the Estonian government, several hackatons with both national and global reach 
were kicked off. According to the government sources, more than 20 applications including 
on-line coronavirus questionnaire, COVID-19 chatbots and automatic sick leave letter 
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admission were developed during the crisis. Also, the Estonian government decided to 
partner with Estonian tech companies to develop a contact tracing application following the 
decentralized DP-3T protocol and capable of integrating with the system supported by Google 
and Apple. As of June, the application was still under development and had caused limited 
public debate.  
 
The COVID-19 crisis also revealed important shortcomings in the government ICT capabilities. 
The government lacked high-quality and real-time monitoring system to track and predict the 
spread of the virus. The key central agency responsible for fighting the crisis – the Health 
Board – publicly admitted that they suffered from limited in-house data and ICT capabilities 
to react quickly to the emerging situation. Some crucial interoperability issues emerged when, 
for example, the health and police databases could not exchange data, causing 
inconveniences for people and unnecessary workload for police. The attempt to use mobile 
positioning data for mapping the change in population mobility was riddled with data 
protection debates and culminated in a rather abstract analysis and no clear follow-up plans. 
 
Germany 
Ines Mergel, University of Konstanz, ines.mergel@uni-konstanz.de 
 
Germany discovered one of the first corona clusters in Europe in January 2020 at an automotive 
supplier in Munich. 16 people were infected by patient zero - a visiting co-worker from China. 
The infected workers and their contacts were quickly isolated and contact tracing helped 
initially to contain the spread. Subsequently however, borders, schools, day cares, 
Universities and stores closed on March 13, 2020. Air travel stopped, civil servants on the 
local and state level, as well as all other non-essential workers were sent into make-shift home 
offices. The official lock-down measures lasted until June 15, 2020 – with intermediary release 
of individual regulations or localized restrictions in hotspots. Criticism focused on limitations 
to the freedom to travel within the otherwise borderless European Union. Politically, the 
Corona crisis has surprisingly unified the political parties leading up to and during the 
lockdown. The success of the invasive measures is mainly attributed to Chancellor Merkel’s 
calm and decisive speeches that appealed to citizen’s sense of community and highlighted 
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the severity of the virus. With preexisting high trust in government operations in general, the 
decisions were largely supported. 
 
IT played an important role during the lockdown and changed the way that public services are 
delivered today. Germany, usually listed mid-field in e-Government rankings, has chosen a 
pragmatic digitization approach during the lockdown: Existing long-term digitalization 
budgets were shifted to allow for ad hoc digitalization of immediate financial assistance 
programs for the self-employed, artists, etc. The political will to digitize the work of public 
administrations to keep the country open, has pushed civil servants who usually delay 
decisions and focus on coordination and control issues to act, convinced by the urgency of 
the situation. 
 
Policy making has been data-driven: decision were based on insights from public health 
experts and virologists. Public health data was collected on a daily basis, testing capacity 
increased to over 1m tests per week, personnel was shifted to public health agencies to 
increase contact tracing, and the publicly available Corona dashboard served as the decision-
making basis for daily political decision making. It displays officially reported new infections 
per day, cumulative data, and feeds into the daily situation reports which include R0 measures 
published by the Robert Koch Institute, Germany’s central public health agency. The nation-
wide €20m Corona Warn App was designed by SAP and was released on June 15, with an 
initial 12,5m downloads. It was designed with input from civil society after criticism on 
surveillance, central data collection, storage on the Open Telekom Cloud (OTC), unclear 
responsibilities and competencies in the reuse of the data. The software code is available on 
Github for continuous improvements from civil society, and traces are not transferred to the 
government, but are saved locally. 
 
Law makers and civil society discussed the obligation to use the app at length and have now 
decided an opt-in approach by appealing to the “Together against Corona” mantra. The debate 
and slogans propagated by politicians appeal to German citizens’ sense of community - to see 
their contributions of using the app as a consensus of the whole society, but especially to 
protect those who are most risk from the disease. This emphasis on inclusion is reminiscent  
of the decisions made during the 2015 refugee crisis. The relative transparent decision making 
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around the Corona app is also a response to other information technologies that were 
deployed without consultation in an ad hoc fashion. 
The German government has initiated the #WirVsVirus hackathon: In 48 hours a record of 
28,361 people worked together on over 1,300 technological solutions for societal and 
governmental virus-related problems and partnered with civil society to implement over 130 
of the submitted solutions. Working in agile sprints, civil servants collaborate with the hackers 
to scale up their solutions and to ensure they could be implemented. 
 
Italy 
Giorgia Nesti, University of Padova, giorgia.nesti@unipd.it 
 
Italy was the first European Country affected by Covid-19. On January 31st two tourists were 
hospitalized in Rome while the first hotbeds of contagion emerged in Lombardy and in the 
Veneto Region where, on February 21st, the first official deaths were reported. After that, 
twelve municipalities were locked-down and between February 23rd and March, the Italian 
Premier Giuseppe Conte officially enforced Phase 1 to control the pandemic nationally. 
During this period all borders were closed, movements within and across regions were 
prohibited, schools, Universities and commercial and touristic activities were suspended, 
while social distancing and the use of masks were introduced. On May 16th the Government 
launched the transitionary Phase 2 with a gradual reopening of all activities. Since February, 
241,819 confirmed cases of Covid-19 have been reported in Italy, 195,106 people have 
recovered and there have been 34,869 deaths, 95% of which have been aged between 60 and 
90.  
 
Since February the Italian Government has launched several digital technology initiatives to 
cope with the emergency. In order to inform citizens about the spread of the virus, the Civil 
Protection department created a COVID-19 Dashboard modelled on the CSSE at Johns 
Hopkins University and an open data repository on GitHub. The Ministry for Technological 
Innovation and Digitalization (MID) and the Italian Agency for Digitalization created the online 
platform Digital Solidarity where firms and civil society associations make freely available 
digital services for smart working, e-learning, and e-reading. They launched the call for action 
‘Innovation for Italy’ inviting firms, universities, foundations, and non-profit organizations to 
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propose innovative services, products, or technologies to prevent, diagnose and control the 
pandemic. A similar approach was also adopted within the regions, particularly in Veneto 
where a call for innovative digital ideas and projects to manage the emergency is still open. 
The MID accelerated the process of digitalization of public administration and created a Task 
Force for Covid-19 Emergency, made of 74 experts who assess and propose data-driven 
solutions to fight the virus. The Government also invested 1.546 million Euros in ultra-
broadband infrastructures and funded the digitalization of the public sector with 50 million 
Euros. Finally, on April 16th, the Government signed a contract with the private firm Bending 
Spoon and the Medical Center Sant’Agostino to develop an app for contact tracing called 
Immuni.  
 
The launch of the app initiated a lively debate in the Italian Parliament, within civil society, 
and in the media. Several concerns were expressed, about the risk that the weak public 
agencies’ information systems could be hacked, and about the violation of citizen’s privacy. 
To cope with these security issues the Government assigned Immuni’s data management to 
the public company Sogei, that uses a centralized server and public infrastructures located 
within Italian national borders while the source code is released under a GNU Affero General 
Public License. The system is based on Bluetooth Low Energy and does not use geolocation 
data so it can trace whether a contact with an infected person took place, how long it lasted, 
and it can estimate the distance that separated the two users, but it can’t trace where the 
contact took place, nor who was involved. After a MID’s parliamentary audition and the 
authorization issued by the Italian Data Protection Authority, the Italian Council of Ministries 
officially approved Immuni on June 1st. and the app has been available from June 15th. To be 
effective Immuni is required to be downloaded at least by 20 milion smarthphone users, and 
to nudge those who received a notification of exposure to COVID-19 to voluntarily self-isolate. 
 
Ireland 
Frank Bannister, Trinity College Dublin, FBNNISTR@tcd.ie 
 
The first case of the virus found in Ireland was recorded on February 29th. It was diagnosed in 
a teenager who had just returned from a school trip to northern Italy. The virus’s arrival was 
not unexpected. For a number of weeks the country had been scrambling to prepare. Ireland 
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faced a number of problems including a low number of Intensive Care Unit (ICU) beds, a 
limited number of available public hospital beds, limited facilities to test for the virus and a 
severe shortage of personal protective equipment (PPE). To complicate matters, a general 
election in February resulted in a hung parliament. Constitutionally, a government, despite 
having been defeated in the election, remains in office until a new government is sworn in. It 
has performed surprisingly well. The strategy adopted was to flatten the curve. This involved 
an immediate lockdown. The government took over (for a fee) the country’s private hospitals, 
thus adding around 2,000 more beds. It ramped-up the number of ICU beds. An all-out effort 
was initiated to speed up testing turnaround and capacity and a large consignment of PPE 
was sourced from China.  
 
Information and ICT have played key roles in this. The government immediately adopted a 
policy of full transparency, thus establishing a high level of trust in its data. Updates are 
published daily on the government’s website, www.gov.ie, that include, inter alia, the latest 
statistics (deaths, cases, number of tests, etc.), charts, maps and minutes of the pandemic 
management group.  A system was rapidly developed for General Practitioners that enabled 
them to schedule tests for patients who telephoned in reporting Covid-19 type symptoms. 
The patient receives an appointment (usually within 24 hours) at the nearest testing centre, 
again on their mobile.  As soon as they are available, the test results are sent electronically to 
both patient and GP. The government has set up 30 testing centres using every location it 
could find (including a warship docked in Dublin port).  
 
Amongst the more surprising consequences of the pandemic is that issues that had been 
fought over for years were suddenly resolved. Electronic prescribing went nationwide almost 
overnight after years of argument between vested interests. Tele-consultations with doctors 
have become common. Less impressive was the development of a mobile app for contact 
tracing. Initially promised for March, it was finally delivered in early July. How effective it will 
be remains to be seen; some experts and academics have pointed out various problems with 
the concept. The App is based on the German model and was developed by a government 
team in conjunction with Apple and Google. It uses Bluetooth technology to measure when 
two mobiles have been within two metres for more than 15 minutes (without revealing the 
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identity of the positive person). The App notifies users if they have been in close contact with 
an infected person. No data is centrally stored.  
 
To date, these actions have been effective. Hospitals and ICU beds have not been swamped 
The number of people in both is now falling as are the number of new cases and the number 
of deaths. The phasing out of lockdown was accelerated by the government in early June. 
Meanwhile, several Irish scientists are arguing for a New Zealand type strategy of crushing  
the virus, though this would require a larger scale testing and tracking system and widespread 
uptake of the App. Ireland is an island, so such a proposition is feasible, though what we do 
about our large tourism industry is unclear. For now, everybody continues to pay close 
attention to the numbers. 
 
Japan 
David Murakami Wood, Queen’s University, dmw@queensu.ca  
 
Given that Japan is advancing a highly future-oriented series of policies towards “Society 5.0”, 
it may be surprising that its response to COVID-19 has often been low-tech. Data-gathering 
and collation has often been carried out with pencils, paper, the fax machine and inked 
stamps (hanko). This bureaucratic-technological path-dependency has resulted in some 
mistakes in data-transfer, but also in 80% of office-workers having no choice but to go into 
work physically despite government advice not to, because they had to use official corporate 
hanko.  
 
Japan has seen a number of debates over its COVID-19 strategy. Early on, the mishandled 
quarantine of the Diamond Princess, resulted in severe embarrassment to the government 
and both a more serious approach, and a $22M propaganda budget to polish Japan’s image 
with foreign media. Another debate was over the “reality” of Japan’s pandemic numbers 
related to the government’s fear of losing the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games, and with the 
release of fuller figures for Tokyo, it seems excess death rates do indeed indicate that 
mortality from COVID-19 may have been 15-20 times the official figures. The reason for this 
undercounting is linked to one of the most persistent controversies - the decision to limit PCR 
testing to cluster-tracing not individual diagnosis. The Abe government discouraged the latter 
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on the grounds that it would overwhelm local health services. Deep cuts to those services 
over the last 25 years since the 1994 Community Health Law may indeed have left Japan’s 
health system unable to cope. The lack of preparedness and cuts in local funding, which has 
meant a shortage of accessible critical care beds, leading to some tragic consequences, 
demonstrated by the unnecessary death of sumo wrestler, Shobushi, as well as a lack of 
knowledge of actual death rates. 
 
Even so, Japan remains relatively successful by world standards. A “cultural hypothesis” may 
go some way to explaining this apparent success, particularly the propensity towards distance 
and reserve (no skin-to-skin contact) and the fact that wearing non-medical face-masks was 
already normal for anyone with disease symptoms, to protect others. However, cultural 
factors have not all been positive, with widespread exclusion and bullying of those with 
COVID-19 and even of healthcare workers.  
 
High technology has however played a significant role in communication. The government 
has relied heavily on LINE to distribute information about COVID-19. LINE is a messaging 
system created by the Korean NHN (now Line) Corporation, that grew from in-house response 
to the 2011 3/11 earthquake, tsunami and nuclear disaster, to being pervasive in Japan, with 
multiple functions including payment systems, a position that was cemented in 2020 by the 
merger of Line Corp with Yahoo Japan, the other major social media corporation in Japan (a 
separate company from Yahoo in the USA). Both the national government and the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government have created COVID-19 dashboards, which provide information 
about infection and death rates (however dubious), as well as information about regulations, 
and recommendations for behaviour. Japanese government policy has long depended upon 
such moral suasion campaigns, now fully digital as well as in traditional poster forms.  
 
Finally, Japan launched a contact-confirmation app, but it was not a simple story. In early May 
the outlines of an app called “Mamoriai” (“Protecting Together”) were made available. It was 
created by NGO, Code for Japan, and backed by the Rakuten corporation. Based on the Apple-
Google API, it was a decentralized app, using on-phone storage, anonymized data, and no 
tracking the user outside of localized (bluetooth) contact between users. It was adopted by 
government and heralded as the official app, but when the government finally released an 
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app, in mid-June, it was not Mamoriai, but a different app, “Cocoa” which, while still based 
on the Apple-Google API, appears to be a parallel scheme developed by Microsoft employees. 
Exactly what happened, and the implications, are still unclear. 
Contact tracing apps are intrinsically flawed as a strategy and Japan’s response has settled on 
a less risky not risk-free technological solution as it emerges from its State of Emergency. This 
may all turn out well or badly – either way, it will be despite, not because of, the Abe 
government’s shifting, evasive and unclear strategy during the pandemic.  
 
Kenya 
Douglas Kimemia, Virginia Commonwealth University, kimemiadk@vcu.edu 
 
Africa faces the world’s most dramatic public health burden, given its constant fight against 
recurring and infectious diseases. Africa faces a preponderance of risk factors - high levels of 
poverty, urban density, overcrowded informal settlements, and limited access to healthcare 
- that combined threaten to exacerbate the pandemic on the continent.  
 
In response to the pandemic crisis, Kenya followed the global trend of imposing shutdowns 
of businesses and human movements. As COVID-19 continues to spread around the world, so 
too have rumors, misinformation, and fake news about the pandemic. To keep the citizens 
informed, the Minister for Health, Mutahi Kagwe has been holding press briefings almost daily 
to update the country on the number of tests completed and positive cases. The numbers 
authenticity has been questioned by the politicians and other people, who argue the 
government is using unreliable testing centers with results are contradictory and lead to 
presumed cases being quarantined in government facilities. 
 
The government has relied mostly on the vernacular radios to disseminate the information, 
especially in the rural areas where people have less access to TVs and the internet. There are 
commercials on social media to reach out to young people. This has led to an information 
divide and failure of fact-checking, especially for the elderly who are also especially vulnerable 
to the disease. The information received is also processed differently in different regions due 
to language differences, and also the ever-changing landscape of the virus. To counter this 
misinformation and the information divide, the Ministry of Health has established a portal for 
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accurate reporting. There are sixty guidelines and protocols posted on the portal. These 
guidelines include information like the importance of wearing masks and other protective 
equipment and hebhaviours. The core idea behind this initiative is to ensure a greater level 
of public awareness.  
 
The critical issue is how to transmit the information reliably to people who have no access to 
the government’s websites due to lack of time, access and illiteracy. The information is 
written in English, which is a second language to the majority of Kenyans. There is a need for 
the government to translate the information into Kiswahili, which is a national language. 
While a significant number of Kenyans have access to cell phones, the internet remains 
expensive and inaccessible in some areas. The majority of the people are unlikely to visit the 
portal to check the most recent guidelines and they are more likely to rely on the informal 
means of communication.  
 
Patient tracing is not a new concept in Africa as it was first used in the Ebola cases in West 
Africa and proved to be very successful. However, the discussion surrounding the citizens’ 
privacy has not been robust. Human Rights groups have warned that the state's heightened 
surveillance measures to monitor citizens during the coronavirus pandemic could result in 
abuse. This is especially the case as there are no regulations or guidelines on how to monitor 
the usage of these applications in relation to protecting citizens’ privacy from abuse. The 
technology or the application of patient tracing has been a bit like the ‘wild west’ as the 
government has left the app development to the entrepreneurs and universities. In early May, 
a local university launched a computer-based contact tracing case management application 
to help address the COVID-19 pandemic. Also, in early May, two youths developed an app 
dubbed Myride Africa, which can be used by public vehicles. Additionally, other apps are 
circulating in the country targeting different service areas. Most Kenyans are not aware of 
these many apps and how they impact their privacy. The Kenyan government has not openly 
talked about who is financing these apps or how the government relates to the developers. 
There are no reported statistics about the extent of their usage within the country or how to 




The Kenyans look forward to the new normal as the country reopens its economic activities 
and human movements. As the government loosens most of the restrictions it is yet to see 
the real impacts, especially on the economy and in relation to new infections. 
 
Mexico 
Luis F. Luna-Reyes, University at Albany SUNY (USA) Universidad de las Americas Puebla 
(Mexico), luisf.luna@udlap.mx 
 
The first case of COVID-19 in Mexico was registered on February 28. The pandemic was 
interpreted by the President as a fabricated problem to introduce instability in his mandate. 
As a consequence, the closing of businesses and social distance recommendations faced 
contentious statements by the President and State Governors. For instance, on the second 
day of business closing (March 18), the President commented: “Honesty is the protection 
[against Covid]... Look, this is my protection [showing a prayer card]... this is a gift from the 
people, and it is not just catholic, I keep here [in my wallet] evangelical cards and others from 
freethinkers…” On the next day, he described the pandemic as a negative campaign promoted 
by the media and political interests against his administration. Such a politicized view of the 
problem promoted lack of coordination among the States and erratic application of policies 
and recommendations with very limited citizen support. Economic impacts have been at the 
center of all discussions and fueled further polarization. Both political and economic pressures 
have pushed the country to reopen under the so-called ‘New Normal’ policy since June 1st, in 
spite of the growing number of cases. 
 
Government policies have been supported by data from the Ministry of Health Information 
Systems, following what the Ministry of Health has called the “Sentinel Data Model.” The 
model gathers information from 26,000 clinics across the country, which report total cases of 
respiratory diseases in each unit. A sample of those units runs tests confirm the prevalence 
of COVID, and sample data is used to estimate national numbers. The Sentinel model is built 
on the assumption that mass testing is a waste of resources, and as a consequence, not 
enough test kits have been made available to the public. Given the politicization of the 
pandemic, the Federal Government accepts these estimates as the only truth. Unfortunately, 
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citizens distrust the official numbers, and their bias towards under-reporting is continuously 
reported by the national and international media. 
 
The ‘New Normal re-opening protocol is guided by another information system with a 
granularity at the state level. The COVID Dashboard shows levels of risk as colors (red, orange, 
yellow and green) resulting from the aggregation of four indicators: hospital occupation, 
positive cases as a fraction of suspected cases, trend on hospitalization and trend on new 
cases. The dashboard is the result of the collaboration of the Ministry of Health, the Mexican 
Council for Science and Technology and the 32 State Governors. Citizens not only distrust the 
data, but perceive coordination as a political strategy rather than a public health concern. 
Although most States are in Red or Orange, the President invited all citizens on June 13 to “go 
out to the street and continue with their regular activities, living without fear [..] follow 
recommendations from the health authorities according to your own judgement.” 
 
Traditional media has been at the center of continuous updates to the citizens, through a daily 
news briefing, with the Ministry of Health’s website acting as a repository of information 
about the epidemic and preventive measures. Mobile apps have been developed at the 
federal and state levels by a diversity of public and private actors, and they provide 
information about COVID-19 and self-screening tools. The federal government app has an 
opt-in option to share data from the app to a repository although it is not clear how the 
information is being used to guide policy. There is no single repository of data gathered by all 
the apps and there has been no public concerns about data privacy. Apps do not seem to be 
widely used, the Federal app shows half million downloads from May 25 to June 15 in a 
country of 126 million people. 
 
In sum, both information systems and policy during the pandemic have been politicized by 
power groups, and highly questioned by the media and society. These two realities have led 








The COVID-19 pandemic manifested itself in March in the Netherlands. From March 12, the 
Dutch government took a broad range of drastic measures to stop the spread of the disease 
and reduce social interactions to a bare minimum. The ‘lockdown’ was relaxed step by step 
from May onwards when first the primary schools were re-opened on May 12, after that the 
secondary schools and restaurants on June 1st. In the first months of the crisis, testing 
facilities for corona were limited. For this reason, people were generally discouraged to get 
themselves tested for corona. Overall, there was some discussion about the consequences of 
these measures for the economy but there was mostly broad support and most people 
followed the rules. 
 
During the lock-down, information technologies were used to support policies and 
operational processes. The National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM) 
used a host of systems to process information as a basis for model building and crisis policies. 
A system that played a role at the operational level was developed by a hospital in Amsterdam 
to help people to establish whether they had symptoms of corona and communicate about 
these symptoms with the hospital. In this period, there was some public discussion about 
information systems. The use of police drones to see if people were outside in groups were 
criticized as being unacceptable instruments of surveillance. And a system that the Ministry 
of Health introduced to promote the national management of intensive care hospitals beds 
was criticized for not being effective and even dangerous by providing incorrect information 
about the availability of beds.  
 
When the government started to develop policies for relaxing the lock down measures, 
information technologies came to play a more strategic role. Two key instruments were 
presented at national conferences as crucial elements in national policies for dealing with the 
COVID-19 crisis: a corona app and a corona dashboard.  
 
The corona app was enthusiastically introduced by the Minister of Health in a national press 
conference on April 7. In the weekend of April 18, the ministry organized a public appathon 
for which eight companies were invited and who were questioned by invited experts. On 
lifestream, thousands of people watched it and posed additional questions. This appathon 
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resulted in much discussion on various (ethical and sensitive) aspects of the app such as 
privacy, the consequences for social relations and the security. Some viewed the appathon as 
a failure since it did not produce a useful app. Others highlighted that the appathon was as 
an innovative way of organizing democratic participation in the development of high-tech 
policy instruments. The development of the app CoronaMelder continued quietly and in the 
beginning of July it underwent small-scale tests. The expectation is that the app will be made 
nationally available in September. 
 
At the national press conference on the COVID-19 crisis on May 19, the Minister of Health 
highlighted the need to build a corona dashboard to monitor the spread of corona. The 
minister talked vividly about the value of the dashboard and compared it to the dashboard of 
a car. It was meant both as a tool for national decision-makers and for informing the public. 
The dashboard is to provide information at a regional level and as such formed the basis for 
specific interventions to limit the spread of the disease. The public dashboard was introduced 
in June (https://coronadashboard.rijksoverheid.nl/). 
 
In sum, there was broad support for the government’s management of the corona crisis and 
discussion about the use of information technologies. The fear of privacy intrusions played an 
important role and Asian examples were seen as undesirable futures due to their emphasis 
on surveillance. These concerns were taken into account in the process of developing an 
introducing information systems but they did not stop the development. At the moment, 
there are no indications that the corona app and the corona dashboard have made a 
significant contribution to the management of the corona crisis. 
 
New Zealand 
Karl Löfgren, Victoria University of Wellington, karl.lofgren@vuw.ac.nz 
 
In the second half of March, following a rising number of cases of COVID-19 in New Zealand, 
the country was effectively put under a state of national emergency on 25 March. The 
national emergency was accompanied by the introduction of an alert level system specifying 
which the public health and social measures were to be taken depending on the level of 
containment and control of the disease. On 25 March, the country went straight into level 
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four – lockdown of the country – which was gradually eased, and a complete removal of all 
restrictions 2 June. In addition to these measures, there has been a travel ban on travelers 
from China since January, and from all other countries since March (citizens and permanent 
residents excluded), and extensive testing of anyone with symptoms. With a limited number 
of cases, isolation and termination of existing clusters of infected individuals, only a limited 
number of reported deaths, and not at least an active prime minister calling for empathy and 
understanding, the New Zealand response has been celebrated as a model for how to tackle 
the virus infection. Like some countries, New Zealand has adopted a transparent approach 
about the state of the virus with a digital ‘dashboard’ with updated information about the 
transmission of the virus and cases (https://nzcoviddashboard.esr.cri.nz).  
 
One of the arguments for the sharp lockdown of the country was the combination of a) the 
imminent risk of community transmission, b) the absence of an efficient vaccine, and c) the 
lack of tracing and tracking capacity (being the only method of keeping the virus at bay). As 
the country begun to lift some of the restrictions, allowing more services to become available 
to the public, it became clear that some kind of tracing system would be needed. Another 
important driver was the reports from Asian countries, and in particularly South Korea and 
Singapore, being successful with their use of smartphone apps for contract tracking.  
 
The Ministry of Health (MoH) begun to develop a digital solution in April and presented in 
May a national contact tracing application containing a smartphone app, a website and a data 
platform. Unlike similar platforms overseas, there was a clear ambition from the very 
beginning to retain ‘consumer’ choice and trust, and to minimise the collection of private 
information to those matters most directly useful to contract tracing processes. The platform 
also ask for a few personal details and all the contract information is stored on the device – 
not transmitted elsewhere. Rather than being a tracker, it has been presented as a ‘digital 
diary’ The system went live on 20 May, two days after the country had come out of most of 
the restrictions. 
 
While the rapid and hard response to the virus in New Zealand probably can be presented as 
a success, the tracing app represents an almost classic story of implementation challenges in 
the public sector. First, the MoH solution was launched too late given that business had to 
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operate with some kind of tracing system from day one. Consequently, many businesses, in 
particularly in the hospitality industry, had already chosen other apps, or just paper-based 
solutions, for tracing their customers. While the effectiveness of the app relies on a majority 
of the population using it, the number of downloads suggests that less than ten per cent have. 
Second, not even all public authorities have chosen to make use of the app. The two biggest 
public health providers in New Zealand have chosen to use their own tracing systems resulting 
in challenges sharing data. Finally, not only are there digital divides at play with respect to the 
number of people owning the necessary smart phones, the app has also been heavily 
criticised for being difficult to use for people with vision disabilities. The app has so far not 
been subject to too much political debate, but that has more to do with the fact that its value 
is considered to be low given the almost complete current elimination of the virus. 
 
South Korea 
Heungsuk Choi, Korea University, hschoi@korea.ac.kr 
 
The first confirmed case of COVID-19 in S. Korea was a Chinese lady from Wuhan, China who 
flew to Seoul for a tour. She was diagnosed on January 20, 2020. The second confirmed case 
occurred on January 24. It was a Korean man who flew into Kimpo International Airport of 
Seoul from Wuhan. The South Korean government instigated “the Central Accident Control 
Headquarter(CACH) for Corona virus contagion,” which is led by the Minister of Health and 
Welfare, and raised its contagious disease crisis level from “alert” to “guard” on January 27. 
The CACH then quickly decided to check up all the 3032 travelers who entered from Wuhan 
during the period of January 13-26. As the S. Korean government had to raise its contagious 
disease crisis level to “serious,” it put into operation the Central Disaster and Safety 
Countermeasures Headquarters(CDSCHQ) led by the Prime Minister on February 23. As of 
July 10, 1,384 thousand people have been tested to result in 13 thousand cumulative cases of 
COVID-19 infection in South Korea where 50 million people reside. The number of COVID-19 
patients in treatment is 985. 
 
While the government was working on to control COVID-19, the first and second mobile 
COVID-19 apps and websites showing the sites of visits by COVID-19 patients, their means of 
transport, etc. were created by university student entrepreneurs and put on the market on 
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January 30 and February 2. Notwithstanding, most local governments put such information 
on their websites and provide each citizen with brief push-messages these days. An 
emergency-approval for a COVID-19 diagnosis kit was given by the Ministry of Food and Drug 
Safety on February 4. The diagnosis kit was developed by a bio-medical SME and tested by 
Korea Centers for Disease Control & Prevention(KCDC). The emergency approval procedure 
was established after experiencing MERS, which killed 38 people in 2015. As of June 25, the 
website of the Ministry of Health and Welfare enlisted 65 S. Korean COVID-19 in vitro 
diagnostics device manufacturers and exporters. 
 
South Korea is a country where 95% of its population use smartphones, and credits cards, 
rather than prepaid transport cards, are widely used for public transportations. Besides, the 
Home Tax System of its National Tax Service let individual citizen do tax reporting with few 
mouse clicks. This creates an ideal environment to track the sites of visits, as well as means of 
transports, of COVID-19 patients. Once those sites of visits and means of transports are 
identified, it even becomes possible to track down those who have possibly come across 
COVID-19 patients. Notwithstanding it would require additional effort, it was how the Seoul 
Metropolitan Government and KCDC, in cooperation with Korea Telecom, managed to send 
SNS messages encouraging voluntary COVID-19 check-up to those who visited the Itaewon 
area on the day when contagions occur in a few dance clubs in Itaewon. 
 
At the outset of the COVID-19 outbreak, the S. Korean government adopted an open data 
policy for complete transparency. It had a very painful lesson from the MERS outbreak where 
it faced very strong public complaints by not revealing the names of the hospitals that MERS 
patients dropped by indeed. Such an open data policy is still put in place, public dashboards 
for COVID-19 being established and keenly updated at the central and local levels. It could be 
maintained that the open data policy has been instrumental to effectiveness in controlling 
the spread of COVID-19. 
 
The whereabouts of individual COVID-19 patient are monitored by KCDC and put on the 
websites of local governments in anonymous form. The outcries for privacy are increasingly 
put forth by some NGOs, professional and academic societies, etc. Besides, serious complaints 
are filed by the owners of shops and restaurants who feel that their businesses are 
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unjustifiably adversely affected by the public data reporting the past visits by COVID-19 
patients. There exist at least anecdotal evidences that show the central and local 
governments are becoming much more sensitive to privacy issues, as well as unjustifiable 
business impacts of the open data policy. It seems, however, that the pursuit of effectiveness 
in controlling the COVID-19 has been dominating the atmosphere so far. Could the path have 
been different, so that more weight was put on privacy? It might have been coincidental that 
the Shincheonji church is generally regarded heretic, and some of those dance clubs in 
Itaewon were gay bars. It seems, however, that these coincidences might well create less 
favorable social and political atmosphere for privacy arguments. 
 
Singapore 
Aarthi Raghavan, National University of Singapore, aarthir@u.nus.edu 
Mehmet Akif Demircioglu, National University of Singapore, mehmet@nus.edu.sg 
 
Singapore saw the first confirmed case of coronavirus on January 23. While the earliest cases 
were imported from Wuhan city, in China, the disease soon started spreading locally in 
February and March. The government targeted identified local clusters and achieved 
significant decline in cases. However, in late March and April the number of cases spiked again 
due to mass transmission among migrant workers staying in dormitories. As of June 27, the 
country has 43,246 confirmed cases and 26 deaths. While an advanced healthcare system is 
a key reason for a low death rate, the government’s proactive adoption of technological 
solutions has ensured prevention and contact tracing. 
 
Singapore developed an early text and mobile web-based software solution on February 10 
which enabled people under quarantine to report their location to government. While the 
Ministry of Health has been sharing case data on its website since the beginning, an individual 
dashboard has also been developed on UpCode Academy (https://co.vid19.sg/singapore/) 
which uses official data to break down specific trends. The Ministry of Health provides daily 
updates on Covid-19 from the following website https://www.moh.gov.sg/covid-19. 
Government also launched a contact tracing app in March, known as TraceTogether, to allow 
authorities to identify people exposed to the infection. Additionally, Telemedicine which used 
video consultations of health issues helped people with comorbidities avoid hospital visits. In 
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May, a robot named Robodog, or Spot, designed by Boston Dynamics, was deployed in public 
parks with prerecorded messages encouraging people to maintain social distancing. Whilst 
this started on a trial basis, officials are considering wider use of the robot for other public 
places.  
 
Singapore launched an extensive nationwide testing strategy which covered nearly 12 percent 
of the population as of June 28. The government has also developed SafeEntry, a national 
digital check-in system for people visiting malls, restaurants, coffee shops, supermarkets, 
parks, and other places. A dedicated website (https://www.flugowhere.gov.sg/) was also 
deployed, to help people search for clinics and access affordable treatment for all kinds of 
respiratory infections. More recently, efforts have been in the direction of better contact 
tracing through wearable devices, which may potentially lead to stricter measures then those 
observed in Europe. 
 
As of late June, nearly 2.1 million people (nearly 37 percent of the population) have voluntarily 
downloaded the TraceTogether app, although experts believe that downloads have yet to 
reach a critical threshold (60-75 percent of the population) to have meaningful impact. Data 
privacy concerns have reportedly limited the use of TraceTogether app, although it has user 
privacy at the core of its design. Critics have also pointed out that the app may not be effective 
as it can generate false positives owing to flaws in Bluetooth technology. Moreover, the 
Personal Data Protection Act (PDPA) in its current form allows organizations to collect, use 
and share personal data of users without consent. In general, there is broad consensus on 
using secure technological solutions to curb the spread of the disease, with robotic and web-
based solutions well-received by the public. 
 
The app has been updated with new features in Chinese, Malay, and Tamil languages - other 
official languages in addition to English- to encourage wider use. Recent debates in the 
country on the effectiveness of the app discussed a technical glitch in Apple smartphones that 
has limited its adoption. While government is working together with Apple to fix this problem, 
officials have declined calls for making the app mandatory. It is believed that this will limit the 
app’s reach and purpose. In the meantime, the Singaporean government is considering 
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nationwide distribution of wearable contact tracing devices to make social distancing more 
feasible, inclusive, and effective. 
 
Spain 
J. Ignacio Criado, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, ignacio.criado@uam.es 
 
According to international evaluations, Spain has a leading role in the use of information and 
communication technologies in government, and during the COVID-19 crisis this has been one 
the main issues at stake. Spain is a very decentralised country with 17 autonomous 
communities (regional governments), all of them having extensive managerial powers in 
health policy. Spain was one of the first European countries to be hit by the pandemic. On 
March 14th, the Spanish Government declared the “state of alarm” and a day later started a 
very strict lockdown, with the confinement of the population and a set of measures restricting 
the mobility of individuals. Also, the Ministry of Health was officially declared the “competent 
authority” and its Health Alert and Emergency Coordination Centre (created in 2004), took 
control over the major strategic health decisions.  
 
At the start of the crisis, the debate concerning the use of technologies to fight COVID-19 
turned concentrated on the provision of public health information. In the first place, the 
Spanish Government used social media to provide information, promote public service and 
to collaborate with citizens. The hashtag #InfoCoronavirus was launched early in March by 
the Ministry of Health @sanidadgob and @SaludPublicaEs or the whatsapp chatbot Hispabot 
COVID19 to answer questions about the disease. Other ICT issues at this initial stage were the 
effectiveness of public information and collaboration using websites and apps, providing early 
diagnosis of coronavirus symptoms, mitigating the workload of emergencies services (112 call 
centres), and restricting the access to primary care centres and urgencies in hospitals for the 
most difficult cases. From the outset, the implications of the use of these websites and apps 
in relation to personal privacy were raised by the Spanish Data Protection Agency.  
 
During the lockdown in Spain, ICTs started to play an additional role in analysing mobility 
patterns. In April the Spanish Government developed a system, in collaboration with the 
major telecommunication providers in the country, previously experimented for the National 
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Institute for Statistics, to monitoring the mobility of citizens via GPS and mobile phones 
signals. Daily reports were made available in the form of a public dashboard. Also, these 
results were used to control and evaluate the confinement, and to strategically use big data 
to understand the potential patterns of future development of the disease. 
 
The need for a trace and track system app was debated during the latter stages of the health 
crisis. The Spanish Government has publicly supported an app to monitor the evolution of the 
COVID-19 with the coordination of the Secretary of State of Digitalization and Artificial 
Intelligence. Whilst different solutions have been assessed and adopted by other European 
governments, the app developed by the Spanish company Indra was endorsed by the Spanish 
Government. This app is now being tested in the Canary Islands, and will use the Decentralized 
Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (DP-3T), bluetooth technology, in order to keep to a 
minimum the personal data gathered, and in order to follow the interoperability standards of 
the EU. This project initiated a healthy public debate about the privacy of personal data, in a 
country with tradition of having a very restrictive approach to such issues.  
 
In summary, in the case of Spain there has been a polarized debate regarding to the 
government’s management of the crisis and the use of ICTs. Initially, the number of infections 
and deaths was higher than most other countries opening up a discussion about the desirable 
start date for the lockdown. This was followed by a debate about ICTs and the collection of 
personal data which has slowed down the implementation of the trace and track app. Health 
authorities have expressed reservations about using such systems, because the percentage 
of the population required to voluntarily download and use the application to make it 
functional, and also because of the problems associated with accuracy and effects of “false-




Ola Svenonius, Swedish Defence Research Agency, ola.svenonius@foi.se 
 
The first confirmed case of SARS-CoV-2 in Sweden is dated as January 31. By March 15, the 
government declared that Covid-19 was spreading on a societal basis, with an epicenter in 
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the Stockholm area. Sweden has adopted a liberal strategy in comparison to many other 
countries. The foremost reason for this is the absence of a state of exception in Swedish basic 
law and the general provisions laid down in the Communicable Diseases Act. The Swedish 
approach puts a high reliance on the individual citizen’s responsiveness to disease control 
instructions. It enjoys high acceptance among the general population, but there is a growing 
concern regarding the number of infections, especially among the elderly and socially 
disadvantaged groups.  
 
The most important actor in Sweden is the Public Health Agency (FOHM). Information to the 
public is mainly communicated through the regional health services and the interagency crisis 
information site Krisinformation.se. In addition, the FOHM maintains a Covid-19 dashboard 
where aggregated Swedish data down to municipal level is provided. Swedish authorities have 
had difficulties solving logistical problems with tests during the crisis. At first, testing focused 
on medical staff and high-risk groups. Only as of June have tests become widely available for 
the general population. From an information technology perspective, two instances stand out 
in the Swedish case: the mobility tracking using aggregated cell phone data, and the failure to 
present a “Corona app” similar to those in other countries.  
 
The first critical test of the Swedish corona strategy – i.e. whether people actually altered 
their behavior voluntarily because of the pandemic – was the Easter holiday. To track whether 
people stayed home, the FOHM received aggregated cellular data from Sweden’s largest 
phone operator Telia. These data showed that the population at large obeyed the instructions 
at that time. The use of cell phone data for mobility tracking was controversial, since it is the 
first time for this kind of data sharing in Sweden. Both private and public representatives have 
taken great lengths to reassure the public that the data is anonymous and that it is impossible 
to re-identify people. Since Easter, the use of cell phone data has been a recurring aspect of 
Swedish corona crisis management, and is now considered quite effective as a monitoring 
tool. The crisis thus paved the way for new public-private partnerships in the wake of the 
pandemic.  
 
By the end of March, the Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) began working on a corona app, 
similar to those used in other countries. A month later, the finished app – a self-estimation 
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tool – was put on hold, because the FOHM claimed not to be in need of the data. Little is 
known about the technical specification of the app, since it has yet to be released, but it is 
claimed that much of the data it generates is already collected elsewhere. The mismatch in 
expectations and intentions between the MSB and the FOHM was widely interpreted as a 
failure to cooperate between the two agencies. There were also ethical and political reasons 
for rejecting the Swedish app. Ethical, because the question arose whether the collection was 
permissible according to the EU GDPR, and political, because the Swedish government 
awaited a European digital tool, and did not want to invest in something that would quickly 
become obsolete. The public debate regarding the use of information technology has mainly 
focused on the use of mobile phone tracking, and partly regarding privacy of the cancelled 
MSB app. A serious debate on surveillance has yet to materialise. 
 
In sum, the Swedish reliance on information technology during the corona crisis unveils 
several aspects of the Swedish legal and political culture, not least concerning the use of 
information technology. Ethical issues did play a role , but far more important was the political 
debate on lack of medical stockpiles, limitations of the Swedish model of crisis management, 
and the failure of state agencies to cooperate. 
 
Turkey 
Mete Yildiz, Hacettepe University, myildiz@hacettepe.edu.tr 
 
The first COVID-19 case in Turkey was identified on March 10. Days later, the Turkish 
government announced drastic measures including the temporary closure of all schools (from 
daycares and primary schools to universities) and many businesses, reorganization of sports 
events to be performed without spectators, a halt to many domestic and international flights, 
and travel restrictions within the country. Public and private hospitals conducted COVID-19 
tests free of charge, subsidized by the government. As of June 30, 3,4 million people (4% of 
the population) have been tested. 
 
Despite the lack of a nationwide lockdown, the Turkish government announced localised 
lockdowns in 31 major cities, where over two-thirds of the population live. These lockdown 
were during weekends and holidays, as well as curfews for older people (+65), patients with 
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chronic diseases and people under the age of 20. The restrictions were eased incrementally 
after May 11, most notably the lifting of lockdowns and travel restrictions on June 1st. 
Although the COVID-19 crisis hit Turkey during an economic downturn, Turkish people 
understood the necessity of these restrictions and mostly abided by the rules. 
 
Turkey effectively used information technology to deal with COVID-19-crisis. The Ministry of 
Health provided daily COVID-19 updates in the form of public dashboards linked to its official 
website and social media accounts. Also, both the Scientific and Technological Research 
Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) and the Council of Higher Education (YOK) launched COVID-19 
portals to provide information, publish COVID-19 research and answer questions from the 
general public. Hacettepe, a leading public university well-known for its state-of-the-art 
hospitals, created a Q&A website where citizens’ COVID-19 questions were answered in short 
videos by Hacettepe’s expert medical personnel.  
 
A mobile application developed by the government, aptly named Life fits into home, enabled 
its users to monitor whether there are infected people in their neighborhoods and their illness 
status through an on-line map. This application, which was introduced on April 18 and 
downloaded by 6 million users, also provided warnings in case of proximity or contact with 
infected individuals. The application was generally favorably received and caused no serious 
public debate other than user calls for updates to make it more user-friendly. Citizens used 
the national e-government portal to apply for free face masks, financial assistance, and QR 
code permits for intercity travels or public agency visits during lockdowns. Finally, a 
crowdfunding website was launched that collected more than 2.1 billion Turkish liras 
(approximately 274 million Euros) from more than 900.000 individuals and organizations via 
SMS donations and money transfers. 
 
There was awareness and discussion that certain countries were using the COVID-19 crisis as 
a window of opportunity to strengthen its state surveillance practices, and as a consequence 
it was emphasized that Turkey’s applications would not be mandatory. There was no 
noteworthy political debate about the application and its risks, however the voluntary 
application was downloaded by only 6 million people, which is 7.2% of the population. 
However, the overall Turkish public opinion about the role of information technology in 
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dealing with the COVID-19 crisis has been positive, as they, in general, welcomed the use of 
these new applications to cope with the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, since the mobile 
application shares the location and the health status of the infected individuals anonymously, 
not many people or organizations raised ethical and privacy concerns. They are mostly 
percieved as more convenient wasy of doing things. For instance, using the e-government 
portal to apply for face masks, financial assistance, and travel permits is widely seen as an 
easier, faster, and much safer way of performing the tasks usually done face-to-face through 
conventional bureaucratic or market mechanisms.  
 
As of June 30, there are no systematic studies or performance data about the value of 
information technologies in fighting the pandemic in Turkey. Although the contribution of 
information technology in dealing with the COVID-19-crisis is unclear, the Turkish people 
appear to embrace the use of these technologies without any specific concerns. 
 
United Kingdom 
William Webster, University of Stirling, william.webster@stir.ac.uk 
 
The COVID-19 pandemic took hold in the UK during March 2020. Initially the UK Government 
was slow to react whilst it deliberated on public policy options, but initiated an extensive 
‘lockdown’ on 24 March. This included financial support for businesses and strict measures 
on ‘social distancing’. The easing of the lockdown started in June with some non-essential 
shops reopening and some pupils returning to school. The different nations of the UK 
(England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) implemented differentiated lockdown rules 
and have subsequently relaxed these at different times. In general, citizens have supported 
the lockdown and there has been a healthy debate about its economic consequences and the 
point at which certain business sectors can become active again. A nationwide ‘contact-
tracing’ testing system was been established. This has proven to be contentious due to the 
accuracy of the system, the willingness of individuals to self-isolate and the number of tests 
desired by government compared to the number of tests actually undertaken. Throughout 
June, and following the Dominic Cummings revelations, there has noticeably been less public 





New ICTs have been prominent in the management of the pandemic. The Scientific Advisory 
Group for Emergencies (SAGE), which provides scientific and technical advice to support 
government decision makers during emergencies, has utilised a range of information systems 
to support scenario planning, forecasting and public policy, although there has been tension 
between the scientific and political impetus behind certain decisions. The Government 
created an online COVID-19 Dashboard showing daily statistics on cases of coronavirus and 
deaths associated with coronavirus. This data has formed the basis of daily Government 
briefings, although there has been concern about underreporting in the statistics. Surveillance 
technologies have been used to enforce lockdown rules, drones have been used to monitor 
remote beauty spots, ANPR has been used to identify drivers inappropriately travelling long 
distances and there has been discourse about whether thermal imaging can be used to detect 
infected citizens. 
 
New digital technology has been a core element of the strategy to oversee the relaxation of 
the lockdown. Considerable emphasis has also been placed on the development of a UK built 
Corona virus ‘Contact Tracing App’ designed to operate on the mobile phones of citizens. The 
app aimed to slow the epidemic, control the flow of patients into hospitals, help people return 
to normal life and gather secondary data for use by the NHS and strategic leaders. Once 
installed, the app used Bluetooth to keep a record of people who came into close contact with 
one another - so long as both parties had installed the app. The app was intended to be 
operational in the early part of April and undertook initial feasibility trials in the Isle of Wight. 
From the outset there were concerns about the levels of state surveillance and about a lack 
of the legally required Privacy Impact Assessment. These concerns were manifest in public 
and media debate about its efficacy and why the Government was being so dogmatic about 
insisting on a bespoke UK system. By mid-June, and with no sign of the app becoming 
operational, the Government signaled a radical change of direction, by announcing that the 
UK would utilise the decentralized system created by Apple and Google and that there would 
be no definitive start date in 2020. 
 
The failure of the UK designed app can be explained by a number of factors. Using Bluetooth 
in this way was untested and it became apparent that users were reluctant to switch on a 
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feature that drained battery capacity so quickly. The proposed system was distinct from 
others in that it was centralized and made personal data available to public authorities, 
thereby raising alarm amongst privacy campaigners. This policy failure was fueled by a 
governmental post-BREXIT desire to develop UK solutions to problems and a populist 




Mila Gasco-Hernandez, University at Albany SUNY, mgasco@ctg.albany.edu 
 
The United States reported its first coronavirus case on January 21 and its first death only a 
few weeks later, on February 29. Although on March 13, Donald Trump declared a US national 
emergency, no further drastic measures were taken at the national level. Response to COVID-
19 came mainly from the states, most of which issued stay-at-homes directives by March 30. 
Testing policies followed the same pattern: the federal government held individual states 
responsible for planning and carrying out all coronavirus testing. But different states adopted 
different approaches. Further, despite significant efforts by some states, such as New York 
and New Jersey, testing did not meet the demand. The lockdown looked therefore very 
different in different parts of the country and so did the reopening that started in most places 
around Memorial Weekend. In an electoral year, discussions about when and how to reopen 
the economy highly reflected the country’s political and social division. 
 
In general, the United States fell behind other countries in the use of information technologies 
to map infections and model the virus spread. Efforts were dispersed and were not led by the 
national government. Although the White House announced in early April the creation of a 
national coronavirus surveillance system, the project was soon criticized for the involvement 
of the private sector and data sharing and patient privacy concerns. Instead, different 
agencies and research institutions used their own databases and dashboards with monitoring 
purposes. For example, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention used multiple 
surveillance systems run in collaboration with state, local and territorial health departments, 
public health, commercial and clinical laboratories, vital statistics offices, health care 
providers, emergency departments and academic partners. One of them was the CDC COVID 
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Data Tracker (https://www.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker), which provided an accurate 
overview of, among other, cases and deaths by state and county, tests performed, trends, 
school closures, and social impact. Similarly, Johns Hopkins University established the 
Coronavirus Resource Center (https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/) to help advance the 
understanding of the virus and inform the public. The website included a COVID-19 Case 
Tracker, updated daily in near real-time for both the world and the United States.  
 
As states began to open, the use of information technologies, and particularly monitoring 
dashboards developed in-house, became more important to support policy and decision-
making. Yet, each state was different and used their own databases, which they made 
available to the public, to inform policy. For example, in the framework of the program Move 
New York Forward, New York State, one of the most affected states in the country, built an 
Early Warning Monitoring Dashboard that provided detailed information by region about the 
criteria that guided phased reopening in the state: testing/tracing targets, new infections, 
severity of infection, and hospital capacity (https://forward.ny.gov/early-warning-
monitoring-dashboard). 
 
Contact tracing apps were also off to a slow start in the United States. In April, North Dakota 
and South Dakota were the first two states that asked residents to download the CARE19 
mobile app, developed by the North Dakota Department of Health in partnership with 
ProudCrowd, to assist in contact tracing. By the end of May only 2% of the residents had the 
app on their phones. Also, in late May, North Dakota, along with Alabama and South Carolina, 
committed publicly to using Apple and Google’s contact tracing technology in statewide apps 
built by government health bodies to slow the spread of the virus. Other states took a 
different approach. Utah, for example, released its first contact tracing app, Healthy Together, 
in late April. The app allowed users to share specific location data with human contact tracers. 
Other states, such Colorado, Florida, and Indiana explicitly stated they would forego digital 
contact tracing in favor of human-based solutions. Yet, at the time of writing, several states, 
including California, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania, are still undecided about digital 
contact tracing mainly because of concerns of potential violations of privacy. Interestingly 
enough, there has not been much public debate around these apps although, according to a 
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recent poll, only 29% of Americans surveyed said they would download and use tracing apps, 
arguing a lack of trust in organizations to keep their information safe. 
 
3. Comparative analysis of information responses to COVID-19 
 
Informational responses to COVID-19: Five functions 
The descriptions of the informational responses in these 21 countries highlight an interesting 
set of government actions. There are substantive differences but also striking similarities in 
the responses of national governments to the COVID-19-crisis. By focusing on ‘informational’ 
activity it is possible to systematically map these similarities and differences and to draw 
attention to the preeminence of the Information polity. Whilst there are lots of models 
characterising the characteristics of information and information and communication 
technologies (Homburg, 2008; West, 2005), here we use a simple analytical framework based 
on six ‘functions’ of information management. These are essentially key ways in which 
informational assets have been utilized by governments to tackle the pandemic. 
 
• Function 1: Management of information for crisis management. Managing 
information about infections, deaths, hospital beds, availability of pharmaceuticals, 
staff at the hospitals, etc., is crucial for crisis management responses. 
• Function 2: Publishing public information for citizens. Providing information to 
citizens about COVID-19 cases, hospital beds, deaths, etc. plays a key role in 
generating support for government policies aimed at restricting contact between 
citizens. 
• Function 3: Providing digital services to citizens. Government portals play a key role 
in developing healthcare services but also providing financial support and access to 
other governmental services. 
• Function 4: Monitoring citizens in public space. Monitoring public space and the 
movement of people is a key element in government activities to enforce lockdowns. 
• Function 5: Facilitating information exchange between citizens. To enable citizens to 
adjust their behavior on the basis of possible contamination with COVID-19. In 
particular the use of ‘Corona apps’ to facilitate the exchange of information between 
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citizens about the possibility of coming into close proximity with those who have the 
disease. 
• Function 6: Developing innovative responses to COVID-19. The crisis demanded 
innovative responses and many countries developed specific strategies and 
interventions for strengthening their innovative capacity. 
 
This model has been developed inductively on the basis of the descriptions of the 
informational responses to COVID-19 in the various countries presented in this report. The 
report does not offer a full comprehensive global analysis, but it does offers significant insight 
into the activity of the information polity during the pandemic. The selection of countries was 
designed to ensure all continents were covered and was determined by the availability of 
experts in the eGovernment scholarly community. The contributing authors were asked to 
provide a general overview of the situation, using the basic guide presented in section 1, and 
were asked specifically to note three key elements of the informational responses: (1) the 
existence of a testing strategy as a basis for collecting policy information about COVID-19 
(function 1); (2) the creation of a public dashboard with information for citizens and policy-
makers (function 2); and the development of  a ‘corona app’ as a basis for influencing citizen 
behavior (function 5). This made it relatively easy to provide a national comparison around 
three key informational developments. 
 
The analysis of the other informational functions was less systematic and relied on a more 
inductive approach. A variety of new technologies for providing services were identified such 
as telemedicine and portals for government aid (function 3). Many other informational 
developments, such as drones and talking robots, (etc.), were identified as strategies for 
supporting the monitoring of citizens (function 4). In a number of countries, specific 
approaches to innovation were mentioned, including hackathons and online platforms 
(function 6). Here, the national description of these developments form the basis of 
comprehending governmental responses to the six informational functions set out above.  
 
Function 1: Management of information for crisis management 
Managing information is a key aspect of crisis management (Housel et al., 1986; Quarantelli, 
1988) and therefore all countries studied here have systems in place for managing all kinds of 
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information related to COVID-19, including the collection of data relating to the number of 
cases, the number of hospital beds, the number of deaths, etc. A key issue for this function is 
the capacity of government to manage information well. For this reason, many countries 
focused on strengthening the management of information, to ensure it accuracy and timely 
availability. Brazil has strengthened the epidemiological surveillance systems in the states by 
enabling a flu surveillance system. And, in Japan it was interesting to note that the 
management of information was achieved by jettisoning high-tech solutions for a paper-
based system. 
 
The crisis also exposed weaknesses in the information infrastructure. In Estonia, for example, 
the government lacked a high-quality and near real-time monitoring system to track and 
predict the spread of the virus. There were crucial interoperability issues when, for example, 
the health and police databases could not exchange data, causing inconvenience  and 
unnecessary workload for police. Not all countries were able to realise strong nationally 
oriented management information systems due to institutional and political issues. In the US, 
for example, efforts were dispersed and were not coordinated by the national government. 
Although the White House announced in early April the creation of a national coronavirus 
surveillance system, the project was soon criticized for the involvement of the private sector 
and for data sharing and data protection concerns. Instead, different agencies and research 
institutions used their own databases and dashboards to conduct monitoring of the virus. 
 
Even though the good management information is widely regarded as a necessity for 
adequate government responses, a common controversial issue was the amount of testing 
that had taken place. From the perspective of reducing uncertainty, collecting information 
through testing makes a lot of sense, but the studies presented here highlight that there were 
significant differences in the amount of testing taking place. In Mexico, for example, the 
government’s strategy is based on the assumption that mass testing is a waste of resources, 
and as a consequence, a limited number of test kits have been made available to the public. 
In South Korea, on the other hand, extensive testing was seen as crucial to managing the 
COVID-19 crisis. It is interesting to note that testing regimes varied considerably between 
countries that in many other respects are quite similar. For example, extensive testing took 




Function 2: Publishing public information for citizens 
Providing adequate information to citizens is generally seen as a key element of crisis 
management (Perry, Taylor & Doerfel, 2003). Most countries have established a dashboard 
and used social media and internet platforms to provide accurate and up-to-date information 
about the crisis to citizens. In many countries, the dashboards are regarded as a reliable 
source of information. In Ireland, the government immediately adopted a policy of full 
transparency, thus establishing a high level of trust in its data, and subsequently on the public 
health decisions made using this data. In other countries, however, public information does 
not afford the same levels of trust. In Mexico, for example, citizens not only distrust the 
accuracy of the data presented, they perceive the provision of this information as part of a 
political strategy. In other countries, such as the US, there is no single trusted source of 
information and the provision dashboards are regionally fragmented, with individual States 
using their own databases to inform policy and the public. An overview of the status of public 
information in each country studied in this report is presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Status of Public Information about COVID-19 
Status Countries 
Government information is public and generally 
regarded as a reliable  
Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Estonia, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, 
Turkey, UK 
Government information is public but its reliability is 
contested 
Brazil, Mexico, Kenya 
There are multiple sources of information  USA 
 
Function 3: Providing digital services to citizens 
Digital services have been available for some time but generally citizens also had the option 
to visit government offices (Sá, Rocha & Cota, 2016). The lock-down situations in many 
countries forces them to find new ways to provide services to citizens since the traditional 
visits to the office of government and public organizations were no longer possible. This 
resulted in a push for realizing and improving a host of online services for citizens both directly 
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related to COVID-19 (e.g. online diagnosis of the disease) but also indirectly related (e.g. 
providing economic assistance to citizens who loss their income due to the lock-down). 
 
The combination of the need to provide medical assistance and at the same time minimize 
the number of movements and contacts between citizens has provide a huge incentive to 
develop and deliver online telemedicine solutions (Hollander & Carr, 2020). In Ireland tele-
consultations with doctors have become commonplace and in Singapore telemedicine 
applications were introduced for  video consultations so that hospital visits were no longer 
required. 
 
Government portals have played a key role in providing financial support and other 
government services to citizens. This was of the utmost importance in a lockdown scenario. 
In many countries, this worked well. However, in countries where citizens had limited access 
to the internet, problems associated with the digital divide emerged. In Brazil, for example, 
the 50 million people that had no access to the Internet were often eligible for certain grants 
and benefits, but had no way of accessing or applying for them. And, many citizens in remote 
areas in Kenya had limited knowledge of English were unlikely to visit the portal to check on 
the most current guidelines and information about the pandemic. Instead they were more 
likely to rely on the informal means of communication. 
 
A specific type of technological development relation to this function was the introduction of 
chatbots (Park, 2017). The Spanish Government launched the chatbot Hispabot COVID19 to 
answer questions about the disease via whatsapp. In Estonia, a COVID-19 chatbot was 
developed for public services on the basis of a hackathon to find useful ICT-based solutions 
to fight the crisis, and in Brazil the robocall system Telesus is used for classification, diagnosis, 
tracking, and registration of epidemiological risk. 
 
Function 4: Monitoring citizens in public space 
The fourth function concerns the surveillance of society to enforce the lock-down. Many 
countries have started to use advanced ICTs, drones and robots, to monitor people in public 
space. In the UK, for example, drones have been used to monitor remote beauty spots, 
Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) systems have been used to identify drivers 
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inappropriately travelling long distances and there has been a discussion about whether 
thermal imaging can be used effectively with surveillance cameras to detect infected citizens. 
Similar uses of surveillance technologies were discussed for use in the Netherlands and 
Estonia. In Singapore, new technology was used not only monitor groups of people but also 
to actively urge them to stick to the rules. For example, a robot was deployed in public parks 
with prerecorded messages encouraging people to maintain social distancing. In Belgium, 
speaking drones were used in Brussels to spread messages about social distancing and drones 
with heat cameras were used to identify people illegally staying in second homes and 
caravans.   
 
It is also evident that a number of countries sought to obtain access to telephone records in 
order to follow the movements of citizens (Ienca & Vayena, 2020). In Spain, for example, 
during the height of the lockdown, the Spanish Government developed a system, in 
collaboration with the major telecommunication providers to monitor the mobility of citizens 
via GPS and mobile phone signals. In Belgium, (local) governments use telecom data to track 
movements of people and to monitor how population density in shopping streets and at the 
beach. 
 
Function 5: Facilitating information exchange between citizens 
The fifth information function relates to the use of informational systems for monitoring the 
spread of the disease in society (Sweeney, 2020). In particular, all governments have at the 
very least, explored the possibility of developing and deploying a mobile phone based ‘corona 
app’ to be used on individual citizen’s phones. This is a digital intervention designed to 
influence the behavior of citizens in order to limit the spread of the disease. Corona apps, 
despite issues about their efficacy, have been a very popular policy intervention in all 
countries. Typically, these have been developed by government in conjunction with private 
providers. All governments have explored the value of these apps for their crisis management 
strategies and only in the US, certain States, such Colorado, Florida, and Indiana have explicitly 
stated they would forego digital contact tracing in favor of human-based solutions. It is also 
evident, in the country reports presented here, that contact tracing apps were the most 
debated and discussed of the technological solutions brought forward during the pandemic. 
Aspects that attracted criticism included concerns about privacy, mass state surveillance, 
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unclear data responsibilities, competencies relating to the reuse of the data and concerns 
about the effectiveness of such systems. At the same time, a number of countries only had 
limited debate about these issues, for example in Estonia, Mexico, Singapore and Turkey. 
 
In general, the country reports highlight there three different approaches: (1) a centralized 
government approach with all data transferred to a central government database; (2) a 
decentralized approach with data held only on citizen’s telephones, in order to protect their 
privacy;  and, (3) a commercial approach with private apps available to the citizenry. In the 
UK, the app was originally intended to follow the centralized model, but after resistance and 
concerns about data processing, this strategy was abandoned in favor of the decentralized 
app used developed in many other European countries. In Mexico, the federal government 
app has an opt-in option to share data from the app with a centralized repository. Only in 
China, was the use of an app compulsory for certain activities, such as taking public 
transportation. An overview of these different national approaches is presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Type of Corona-app by Country 
Type of Corona-app Country 
Centralized  Australia, China, Ireland, Italy, Singapore, Turkey 
Decentralized Brazil, Canada, Estonia, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Spain, Sweden, UK, US 
Commercial Kenya 
 
The country reports show that in many cases these apps were not yet operational, and where 
they were, that not many citizens were actually using them. The most advanced patterns of 
use were found in Asia and Oceania, with for example 10 million users in Shanghai, 2.1 million 
users (nearly 37 percent of the population) in Singapore and 6 million downloads in Australia 
and in Turkey. The high usage in China can be attributed to the compulsory use of the app for 
travel on public transport. Analysis of the effectiveness of these apps for tracking and tracing 
the disease stresses the intensity of the use of mobile phones in the country and the need for 
a majority of citizens to voluntarily download and use the apps. South Korea is well placed 
here as 95% of its population use smartphones, and credits cards rather than prepaid 
transport cards are widely used for public transportations and other financial transactions. In 
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countries with less intensive usage, such as countries in Africa and Latin America, the apps 
can track a much lower proportion of the population. In the country reports it is evident that 
the Asian countries were leading the way in relation to this information this function. In New 
Zealand, it was noted that reports from Asian countries, in particularly South Korea and 
Singapore), were influential drivers for developing a contact tracing app in the country.  
 
It is interesting to note, that whilst most countries developed their ‘own’ nationally oriented 
app, many were based on similar technological solutions provided by the big commercial 
mobile phone companies. Global policy diffusion and transfer has clearly taken place and 
many countries have adopted policies and technologies that have been successful in other 
parts of the world. In Ireland they have adopted the German model and in Australia the app 
developed in Singapore. Other countries, such as the UK, have been determined to develop 
local technological solutions, which is surprising as the basic functions of the app can be 
assumed to be highly similar in all countries. The development of these apps also highlights 
two themes familiar to scholars of eGovernment. Firstly, the discrepancy between the vision 
and potential of the technological solution when compared to what it actually delivers, and 
secondly, the increasing reliance of public service providers on the technological expertise of 
commercial suppliers. 
 
Function 6: Developing innovative responses to COVID-19 
The final function identified here does not focus on the informational responses themselves 
but on novel ways for developing these responses (for a theoretical overview: Yuan & Gasco-
Hernandez, 2019). Various countries highlighted that new approaches were used to promote 
and develop innovation. Estonia organized several hackatons to find useful ICT-based 
solutions to fight the crisis More than 20 applications including on-line coronavirus 
questionnaire, COVID-19 chatbots, remote verification for notaries, automatic sick leave 
letter admission and other projects were developed. The German government organized a 
hackathon in which 28,361 people collaborated on over 1,300 technological solutions for 
societal and governmental problems that arose as a result of the virus. This hackathon made 
it into the Guinness book of records. The Italian government created an online platform where 
firms and civil society associations were able to provide free digital services for smart working, 




Do informational responses work? 
The key question for all countries is whether these informational responses work. At this 
stage, the answer to this question is that we don’t really know. It is likely that some 
informational responses presented here will be more successful than others and that 
judgements about effectiveness and value for money will be determined in the future. To 
date, as reported by the national experts here, there are no systematic studies or 
performance data about use of information technologies in fighting the pandemic. This does 
not stop governments from having great confidence in the value of these informational 
responses or in promoting their use and capabilities. In many ways, the use of new shiny new 
digital technology solutions provides evidence that national governments are doing 
something, regardless of any evidence about their efficacy, to stop the spread of the virus. 
 
4. Conclusions 
This multi-country report set out to provide insight into the informational responses of 
national governments to the COVID-19 pandemic. A brief overview of the situation in 21 
countries around the world is presented, followed by an inductive comparative analysis of the 
rich material collected through these expert reports. This final section draws conclusions on 
the patterns identified, it identifies topics for further investigation and presents tentative 
recommendations for national governments. 
 
One concluding observation from this multi-country report is that a focus on information and 
on information technology can act as what John Taylor (1998) refers to as an ‘X-ray to study 
public administration’. An analysis that focuses on information responses generated insights 
that provide a more general understanding of the public sector in the different countries 
studied. The analyses highlighted patterns of institutional breakdown in the form of contested 
information, lack of support for government interventions and federal government leaders 
who criticized responses at the state level (US, Brazil, Mexico), patterns of institutional 
dominance when responses were not – or could not be – contested and governments did not 
tolerate any deviance from its prescribed behavior (Singapore, South Korea, China), and 
patterns of institutional democracy (various European countries, Canada and countries in 
Oceania), where informational responses were largely accepted but specific responses were 
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contested and, in general, there was a call for more attention to privacy and other public 
values. The informational responses help us to analyze institutional differences between the 
countries. 
 
A second conclusion is that information responses cannot only be studied from a rational 
perspective on government strategies but need to be studied as political and symbolic 
interventions. In terms of symbolism, there was much emphasis on corona apps as the ‘golden 
bullet’ for dealing with the pandemic. In Asian countries such as South Korea and Singapore, 
but also in European countries such as Netherlands and Germany, there has been great 
emphasis on developing an app as a means to manage the spread of COVID-19. Evidence 
about the effectiveness of this app is lacking and the app was strongly contested in many 
countries. In terms of politics, the analysis highlighted that seemingly rational actions, such 
as testing for corona or providing public information about the pandemic were highly 
politicized in many countries. This has been especially the case in countries like the US, UK 
and Brazil. This highlights that informational responses cannot be understood without an 
analysis of political dynamics and that to understand technological deployments and decision-
making requires a full comprehension of the informational polity. 
 
A third conclusion is that the informational responses encompass much more than developing 
a corona app. The overview of the six functions shows that governments have implemented 
a great variety of interventions to strengthen their information management. In public 
debates in many countries, there has been a strong focus on the pros and cons of developing 
an app, but the app is actually only one specific intervention. The rich descriptions presented 
here highlight that we need to broaden our analysis to understand the interlinkages between 
the various interventions. A key finding, is that governments need to ensure that these 
various interventions work for all groups in society. Especially those vulnerable groups who 
do not have access to the informational responses discussed here.  
 
The analysis undertaken for this report was largely descriptive and it is not possible to draw 
concrete conclusions about the effectiveness of the different approaches adopted. At the 
same time, on the basis of the extensive literature on information management in the public 
sector, it is important to highlight  the significance of developing a comprehensive approach 
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with a clear focus on public value and the information polity. The conceptual idea of the 
‘information ecosystem’ (Nardi & O’Day, 1999) can help to highlight and understand the 
interlinkages between the six functions identified here, and to assess whether these functions 
combined make a significant contribution to public health policies. In addition, the whole 
information ecosystem needs to be analyzed in order to assess the legitimacy of the various 
national responses. 
 
In sum, this exploration of the informational reactions of national governments to the COVID-
19 pandemic, on the basis of expert reports, has generated a rich variety of findings and 
insights. This, however, is only the start of academic research into this subject. More 
systematic and robust academic research is required to develop a research-based academic 
understanding of these informational reactions. Two topics can immediately be identified for 
further future research. The first is a systematic measurement of the informational responses 
in (all) countries around the world. Our inductive analysis now needs to be followed by 
deductive research in which the six functions that we identified are systematically measured 
to enable a thorough comparative analysis. Building upon existing approaches, an analytical 
instrument should be developed to measure these different functions in a consistent manner. 
The systematic measurement can be used to analyze relations between informational 
responses and outcomes in terms of the management of the COVID-19 pandemic. The second 
topic is an in-depth analysis of the relation between different informational responses and 
outcomes of the COVID-19 crisis management. Through in-depth studies of patterns over time 
and through causal process tracing, insights can be generated about the effectiveness and 
legitimacy of different informational responses in different contextual conditions. Scholars of 
e-government and the information polity are well placed to further this research agenda and 
to provide important insight and evidence about the way in which the COVID-19 pandemic 
has been managed across the world. 
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